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Abstract
This paper explores the linkage between corporate risk management
strategies, investment, and economic stability in an open economy with
a flexible exchange rate regime. Firms use currency futures contracts to
manage their exchange rate exposure – caused by balance sheet effects
as in Krugman (2000) – and therefore their investments’ sensitivity to
currency risk. We find that, depending on whether futures contracts
are used for risk reduction (i.e., hedging) or risk taking (i.e., specula-
tion), the implied magnitudes of recessions and booms are decreased or
increased. Corporate risk management can therefore substantially affect
economic stability on the macrolevel.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the implications of corporate risk management in a
balance sheet-triggered currency crises model as it was introduced in the literature
by Krugman (1999, 2000). First, we investigate the real-financial interface on the
microeconomic level. Firms’ investment policies are assumed to depend on foreign
currency denominated debt. The value of this debt (measured in domestic currency)
is thus subject to exchange rate fluctuations. The higher the debt burden measured
in domestic currency, the less the firms can invest, due to the operation of credit
constraints. Second, we explore the relevance of these microeconomic factors for
macroeconomic stability in a flexible exchange rate regime. A currency crisis (i.e.
a steep devaluation of the domestic currency) will increase firms’ debt burden and,
therefore, have a deleterious effect on investment due to its financing conditions.
Significantly decreasing investment leads in turn to large output losses, as described
by the IS equilibrium relationship or a dynamic multiplier process.
Hence, we have a feedback chain leading from large devaluations via the foreign-
debt burden of firms and their investment possibilities to macroeconomic activity
and employment. In this basic situation, we give in this paper – compared to Flaschel
and Semmler (2006) – the firms an instrument to interrupt the feedback channel right
at the beginning. We assume that firms can trade currency futures to influence their
investment’s exposure to currency risk. In the literature, widespread corporate use
of derivative securities is well documented. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995, p. 743-744)
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point out that the demand for risk management vehicles by corporations was an
important component of the “explosion in financial innovation” that has occurred
in the 1980s and 1990s. There are a number of reasons for firms to implement
such hedging strategies.1However, firms have also incentives to speculate.2 Risk
management, in our approach, therefore comprises strategies for risk reduction as
well as strategies for risk taking.
There are several articles investigating the link between demand for financial deriva-
tives by corporations and firms’ investment policies.3However, there is rarely any lit-
erature dealing with the implications of the ‘financing-risk management-investment’
interface for macroeconomic behavior. This paper therefore examines the impact
of risk management strategies on aggregate investment and on aggregate demand
and output. We show that the magnitude of potential recessions and booms signif-
icantly depends on whether corporations use financial derivatives for hedging or for
speculation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a Flaschel and Semmler (2006)
type Mundell-Fleming-Tobin (MFT) model adjusted to allow for the treatment of
Krugman (2000) type currency crises situations. Section 3 introduces linear hedging
and speculation into the model and considers their implications. Section 4 presents
simulation results implied by our modification of the MFT approach to macroeco-
1See e.g. Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Fung and Leung (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and
Stein (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Beatty (1999), and Albuquerque (2003).
2See e.g. Guay (1999).
3See e.g. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993, 1994), Tufano (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Fatemi
and Luft (2002), and Lin and Smith (2005).
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nomics. In addition to hedging and speculation, the role of futures trading costs
and the impact of capital flights is also investigated. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The basic Krugman version of the MFT model
The basic model is a marriage of a traditional Mundell-Fleming model with a port-
folio approach “which owes much to Tobin”4. The model consists of a goods market
equilibrium curve (an IS curve) and the a financial markets equilibrium curve (called
AA curve). We characterize equilibrium in the goods market by the condition that
production Y must be equal to aggregate demand, i.e., to the sum of consumption
C, investment I, government expenditure G, and net exports NX:5
Y = C(Y − δK¯ − T¯ ) + I(e) + G¯+NX(Y, Y¯ ∗, e) (1)
Consumption and government expenditures are defined as customary in an IS rela-
tionship. The representation of investment and net exports needs some explanation.
As usual, net exports depend negatively on domestic output Y and positively on
foreign output Y¯ ∗. The main feature of the model is therefore the interface between
the responses of investment (here assumed to depend negatively on the exchange
rate as in Krugman (2000)) and net exports to exchange rate changes. A depreci-
4Rødseth (2000, p. 169) with a modified investment behavior of firms as introduced in Krugman
(2000).
5This equation can be reduced to an equation representing the domestic goods market solely
if the domestic absorption of foreign goods is cancelled against the import component in the net
export function.
3
ation of the domestic currency which is equivalent of a rise in the price of foreign
exchange will make domestic goods more competitive. Ceteris paribus, net exports
will increase (NXe > 0) if the Marshall-Lerner conditions are assumed to hold. If
this is the only effect on the goods market, the IS curve will be upward sloping in
the output – exchange rate phase space. Yet investment is here assumed to depend
on the exchange rate as well.
Krugman (2000) introduces an investment function where firms have substantial
debts denominated in foreign currency. A depreciation of the domestic currency
will increase their debt, measured in domestic currency, and therefore worsen the
balance sheets of these firms. These balance sheet problems will lead the firms –
voluntarily or unvoluntarily – to cut back investment (Ie < 0). Figure 1 shows this
type of an investment function. The function is downward sloping and due to credit
rationing and supply side bottelnecks on both sides nonlinear. The nonlinearity
is due to the fact that exchange rate changes affect investment strongly only at
intermediate values of e, around steady state investment I(e0). The reason is that,
for very high or very low values of e, changes of the exchange rate do no longer
have such a strong impact effects on investment. In the case of high values of e,
for example, the debt value measured in domestic currency is already very large
and the resulting investment is already close to its minimal sustainable value. In
this situation smaller exchange rate changes will not have the same impact as for
intermediate ranges around I(e0). At low exchange rates investment plans can be
extraordinarily high, but are then reduced by supply bottlenecks.
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II(e0)
e
Figure 1: The Krugman type investment function.
The nonlinearity of the investment function allows for the possibility of a balance-
sheet driven financial as well as real crisis. At mid-range-values of e where investment
reacts strongly to exchange rate changes, these negative balance sheet effects may
outweigh the positive competitiveness effects (Ie > NXe). This will cause the goods
market curve to bend backward for such exchange rate changes. In the case of
extraordinarily high or low values of e, where investment is not that sensitive to
changes in the exchange rate, the competitiveness effects however outweighs the
balance sheet effects (NXe > Ie). In this case the goods market curve is upward
sloping. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we can derive the slope of the IS
curve analytically:
Y ′(e) = − Ie +NXe
CY +NXY − 1 (2)
We assume CY + NXY < 1. Therefore the term CY + NXY − 1 in equation (2) is
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negative. Hence, Ye is upward sloping if NXe > Ie and backward bending otherwise.
The financial sector in this model is represented by the financial markets equilibrium
curve (AA curve). The AA relation consists of the following equations:6
Risk premium (definition): ξ = r − r¯∗ − ε (3)
Expected rate of depreciation: ε = βε(
e0
e
− 1), εe ≤ 0 (4)
Private Wealth: Wp =M0 +B0 + eFp0 (5)
LM-Curve: M = m(Y, r), mY > 0,mr < 0 (6)
Demand for foreign bonds: eFp = g(ξ,Wp), gξ < 0, gWp ∈ (0, 1) (7)
Demand for domestic bonds: B = Wp −m(Y, r)− g(ξ,Wp) (8)
Foreign exchange market: F¯ ∗ = Fp + Fc (9)
Equation (3) defines the risk premium ξ as the difference between domestic and
foreign rates of return on bonds, i.e., by the difference between the domestic interest
rate and the foreign one, the latter augmented by the expected rate of currency
depreciation. Equation (4) defines the expected rate of currency depreciation, mak-
ing use of a standard regressive expectations mechanism as it is extensively used in
Rødseth (2000), with εe ≤ 0 and ε(e0) = 0 for the steady state exchange rate level
e0. Economic agents have perfect knowledge of the future equilibrium exchange rate
and therefore expect the actual exchange rate to adjust to the steady state value
after the occurrence of a shock. Flaschel and Semmler (2006) describe these ex-
6The goods price level p has been set equal to one in these equations and in all that follows.
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pectations, allowing agents to behave forward looking, as asymptotically rational.
This assumption ensures that obtained instability is not caused by the expectations
formation process, but due to other forces in the model of this paper. Equation (5)
defines initial private sector wealth as a portfolio of domestic money M0, domestic
bonds B0, and foreign bond holdings eFp0. Equations (6), (7), and (8) present the
three asset demand equations of the private sector. Equation (9) is the equilibrium
condition for the foreign exchange market where the total amount of foreign bonds
held in the domestic economy F¯ ∗ equals domestic private foreign bond holdings eFp
plus the central bank’s foreign bond holdings Fc. We assume as in Rødseth (2000)
that domestic bonds cannot be traded internationally which implies that the for-
eign bond holding in the domestic economy is only changed (sluggishly) through
imbalances in the current account (and not by international capital movements).
Inserting equation (3) and equation (5) in equation (7) gives the financial markets
equilibrium curve (AA curve):
eFp = g(r(Y,M0)− r¯∗ − βε(e0
e
− 1),M0 +B0 + eFp0) (10)
Note that in a flexible exchange rate regime the central bank need not intervene on
the foreign exchange market, i.e., Fp can be considered a given magnitude in such a
case. The slope of the AA curve is determined by the Implicit Function Theorem:
e′(Y ) = − gξ ∗ rY−gξ ∗ εe + (gWp − 1) ∗ Fp0
< 0 (11)
The AA curve is downward sloping since gξ < 0, rY > 0, εe ≤ 0, gWp ∈ (0, 1), and
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Fp0 ≥ 0. In the following sections we will assume the AA curve to be linear to ease
graphical expositions.
e
IS
e1
Y1
E1
AA
Y2Y3
e2
e3
E3
E2
Y
Figure 2: The IS-AA model.
Figure 2 shows the IS-AA model with multiple equilibria. Such a situation occurs if
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign bonds (to be measured
by the first partial derivative of the g−function) is assumed to be sufficiently high.
There are then two equilibria on the upward sloping segments of the IS curve (E1
and E3) and one equilibrium on the backward bending segment of the IS curve (E2).
In equilibrium E1 and E3 the competitiveness effect dominates the balance sheet
effects (NXe > Ie), whereas in equilibrium E2 the balance sheet effect dominates
the competitiveness effect (Ie > NXe).
In order to study the stability of the system the Jacobian matrix is derived:
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J =
 βY [CY +NXY − 1] βY [Ie +NXe]
βe[gξ ∗ rY ] βe[−gξ ∗ εe + (gWp − 1) ∗ Fp0]

Considering gξ < 0, rY > 0, gWp ∈ [0, 1] and εe ≤ 0, we obtain the following signs:
J =
 − ?
− −

The stability of the equilibria (E1, E2, E3) depends on the sign of ‘?’ in the Jacobian
and therefore on the question which effect (NXe or Ie) dominates the other one.
As we already mentioned, in equilibrium E1 and E3 the IS curve is upward sloping
and NXe > Ie holds. In this case the ‘?’ has a positive sign. The determinant of
the Jacobian is positive (det(J(E1,3)) > 0) and the trace is negative (tr(J(E1,3)) < 0).
Equilibrium E1 and E3 are stable. Yet, equilibrium E2 is unstable since Ie > NXe
which results in a negative sign of ‘?’. With a negative ‘?’, the determinant7 and
the trace of the Jacobian are both negative (det(J(E1,3)) < 0 and tr(J(E1,3)) < 0).
8
The three equilibria presented in Figure 2 represent three different states of the
economy. Equilibrium E1 stands for the stable ‘good equilibrium’ with high output
and a low exchange rate. E2 represents the fragile intermediate equilibrium,
9 and
E3 is the stable ‘crisis equilibrium’ with low output and a high exchange rate.
7Since the slope of the IS-curve is less negative than the slope of the AA-curve.
8For more details on such a stability analysis see the ‘trace-determinant plane’ in Hirsch, Smale
and Devaney (2004, p. 63).
9A saddlepoint with unstable arms running towards the two stable equilibria.
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3 Introducing linear hedging and speculation
In this section we give firms an instrument to influence their investment’s sensitiv-
ity to exchange rate movements. As already mentioned above, a rise in e (i.e., a
depreciation of the domestic currency) will increase the value of foreign currency de-
nominated debt in terms of the domestic currency. If the debt has to be settled, or if
specific debt payments occur after the devaluation, the firm incurs a loss. Moreover
their balance sheet and the implied net worth of firms may be considered as measure
of the credit-worthiness of firms and lead to credit rationing in cases where large
depreciations occur. By contrast, in the case of an appreciation of the domestic cur-
rency, the value of the debt of firms is reduced and their credit worthiness increased.
Figure 3 illustrates the value of a single payment depending on the exchange rate.
Payoff
e0
Profit
e
Loss
Figure 3: Firm’s payoff depending on e.
Assume now that the firms have the possibility to enter into futures contracts in
order to reduce their exposure to the exchange rate (hedging) or to take on even
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more risk (speculation). In our model, futures trading activity affects the investment
function which has to be reformulated then as a function I(e, fd):
I(e, fd) = I(e0)− (ArcTan(e)− fd ∗ ArcTan(e))− cf ∗ fd (12)
with demand for futures contracts given by fd, and the costs associated with such
futures trading given by cf . We assume that futures demand f
d equals futures
supply f s:
fd = f s = f (13)
If we only allow for hedging activities we get 0 ≤ fd ≤ 1. In the case fd = 0 there
is no demand for futures and therefore no hedging activity. In this case, we get the
following investment function10
I(e, fd) = I(e0)− ArcTan(e) (14)
which corresponds to the graphical representation of the Krugman (2000) investment
function presented in Figure 1.
If fd = 1 we speak of a perfect hedge since negative effects of e on investment are
completely offset by positive effects of e on the futures position (i.e., (ArcTan(e)−
fd∗ArcTan(e)) = 0 in equation (12)). Hence, investment is not exposed to currency
risk anymore. Investment stays on its steady state level I(e0) minus the hedging
costs cf :
10See Proan˜o, Flaschel and Semmler (2005) for a similar representation of investment.
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I(e, fd) = I(e0)− cf (15)
For values of fd between 0 and 1, the futures position partly offsets investment’s
exposure to currency risk.
Payoff
e0
Spot Position
Long Futures
Position
Hedged
Position
Profit
Loss
e
Figure 4: Firm’s perfectly hedged payoff.
Figure 4 illustrates a perfect hedge for a specific spot payment. The futures position
generates profits if the spot position generates losses due to exchange rate changes.
Profits and losses sum up to zero. It is important to note that with this linear
hedging strategy it is not possible to benefit from an appreciation. If the spot
position generates profits, the futures position will generate losses, again summing
up to zero. If all single payments of firms are hedged this way, the investment
function is independent of exchange rate movements.
Summarizing, we have the following representation of the investment function in the
case without speculation:
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I(e, fd) =

I(e0) = I¯ if firms are perfectly hedged (f
d = 1).
I(e, fd) if firms do not hedge perfectly (0 < fd < 1).
I(e) if firms do not hedge at all (fd = 0).
(16)
In order to analyze speculation we have to allow for negative values of fd. If we set,
for example, fd = −0.5, we get
I(e, fd) = I(e0)−(ArcTan(e)−(−0.5)∗ArcTan(e))−cf ∗|−0.5| ⇒ I(e0)−cf (17)
⇒ I(e0)− 1.5 ∗ ArcTan(e)− 0.5 ∗ cf (18)
Note that we have multiplied the absolute value of fd with the trading costs cf
in order to guarantee that the costs affect investment negatively. Firms take on
risk in the futures markets and, therefore, increase the sensitivity of investment
to exchange rate changes. Figure 5 presents this risk-taking strategy connected to
a specific payment. Speculation affects the slope of the curve leading to higher
sensitivity of the cash flow.
13
Payoff
ee0
Spot Position
Speculative
Position
Profit
Loss
Figure 5: Firm’s payoff plus speculation.
4 Simulation studies of the model
In this section we simulate the model in order to get more insights into the mecha-
nisms that determine the model’s outcomes. We will concentrate on the interaction
between investment and net exports, and therefore on the slope of the IS curve.
We here define the investment function by
I(e) = I(e0)− b1 ∗ (ArcTan(b2 ∗ e)− fd ∗ ArcTan(b2 ∗ e))− cf ∗ |fd| (19)
We set I(e0) = 0, b1 = 100, and b2 = 0.1.
11Figure 6 shows the investment function
with fd = 0. The ArcTan investment function is a good representation of the
Krugman(2000) function as presented in Figure 1.
11Note that, the parameters are not chosen in accordance with empirical data, but in order to
fit the graphical representation.
14
Figure 6: ArcTan investment function.
Next, we introduce this investment function into the IS curve of the model:
a1 ∗ e3+ I(e0)− b1 ∗ (ArcTan(b2 ∗ e)− fd ∗ArcTan(b2 ∗ e))− cf ∗ |fd| −Y = 0 (20)
with a1 ∗ e3 representing net exports.12 Again, we focus on the interaction of output
Y and the exchange rate e. All other variables and relations like consumption C
and government expenditure G¯ are set to zero for reasons of simplicity. We set
a1 = 0.0001 and get the following IS relation:
0.0001 ∗ e3− 100 ∗ (ArcTan(0.1 ∗ e)− fd ∗ArcTan(0.1 ∗ e))− cf ∗ |fd|−Y = 0 (21)
12Aschinger (1995) investigates stock market crashes with a similar model.
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Figure 7: IS Curve.
Figure 7 shows the IS curve without futures trading (fd = 0). In the mid-range of
e, where e goes from about −50 to 50, the IS curve bends backward. In the next
sections we will model the hedging activity and also speculation as well as the role
of futures trading costs.
4.1 Hedging activity
In this section we investigate the impact of corporate hedging on economic stability.
In the context of our model, we allow fd to range from 0 to 1. Moreover, we set
cf = 0. We will discuss the role of futures trading costs in a later section.
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Figure 8: Investment function with fd = 0, fd = 0.5, and fd = 1.
Figure 9: IS Curve with fd = 0 (solid line), fd = 0.5 (dotted line), and fd = 1
(dashed line).
Figures 8 presents the investment function for different hedging-levels (fd = 0,
fd = 0.5, and fd = 1). Figure 9 illustrates the effect of these various hedged
investment functions on the IS relation. The investment function linearizes with
growing hedging activity which in turn reduces the backward bending segment of
the IS curve. Figure 10 shows the effects of growing hedging activity on the IS curve
with fd ranging from 0 to 1.
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Figure 10: IS curve with fd ranging from 0 to 1.
Although the investment function is linear in the case of perfect hedging (fd = 1),
the IS curve is still nonlinear. This is due to our definition of net exports. However,
in the case of a perfectly hedged investment function, the IS curve slopes strictly up-
wards. There is no backward bending segment and therefore, there are no multiple
equilibria. To make this point more obvious, we introduce a very simple represen-
tation of the AA curve into the model. Again, we focus on the ‘Y-e interface’ and
ignore all other influences. As we assume the AA curve to be linear and downward
sloping, we define the AA curve simply as e+ Y = 0.
Figure 11 shows the IS-AA model with fd = 0, fd = 0.5, and fd = 1. In the
case without hedging (fd = 0) we have three equilibria. Equilibrium A represents
the ‘good equilibrium’, B is the intermediate steady state equilibrium, and C is the
‘crisis equilibrium’. If half of the investment is hedged (fd = 0.5), there are still
three equilibria. However, the magnitudes of recessions as well as of booms are
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reduced. This is because spot losses and futures profits (or spot profits and futures
losses respectively) are more and more balanced with growing hedging activity. If
investment is perfectly hedged (fd = 1) only the intermediate equilibrium B remains.
Moreover, this formerly fragile equilibrium is now stable since NXe + Ie ≥ 0 (i.e.
the IS curve does not bend backward).
Figure 11: IS-AA model with fd = 0 (solid line), fd = 0.5 (dotted line), and
fd = 1 (dashed line).
Figure 12 presents the IS-AA model for fd ranging from 0 to 1. Note that, for fd = 1
there is only one equilibrium determined by the intersection of the AA-plane with
the IS curve. With fd going from 1 to 0, the backward bending segment of the IS
curve increases which leads to multiple equilibria.
19
Figure 12: IS-AA model from different viewpoints.
4.2 Speculation
In this section, futures demand fd is in the range [−1, 0], where fd = 0, again, is
the case without futures trading and therefore without speculation. If fd = −1,
firms double their exposure to currency risk. Of course, speculation in general is not
bound to doubling the existing risk. However, analyzing futures trading for values
fd < −1 does not yield additional insights. Therefore, we restrict our investigation
to the range −1 ≤ fd ≤ 0.
Figures 13 and 14 show the impact of speculation on the IS-AA model. In contrast
to the case where firms hedge, here, the backward bending segment of the IS curve
increases. This leads to the possibility of more severe recessions but also to the
possibility of larger economic booms. Note that, again, we set futures trading costs
equal to zero. We will discuss their role in the next section.
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Figure 13: IS-AA model with fd = 0 (solid line), fd = −0.5 (dotted line), and
fd = −1 (dashed line).
Figure 14: IS-AA model with speculation from different viewpoints.
4.3 Futures trading costs
Thus far we have set futures trading costs to zero. In this section we discuss the
role of futures prices in the case where firms use futures to hedge their currency
exposure. Note that, “A ‘futures price’ is something of a misnomer, for it is not a
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price at all.”13 In general, traders have to deposit an initial margin at the exchange
when a position is opened or increased. If a futures position generates losses, the
holder of the position has to deposit an additional amount reflecting his losses.
However, if the futures position generates profits, the holder of the futures position
obtains payments. Nevertheless, we tread these initial margin requirements as costs
since they reduce the firms’ financial means to invest. Additionally, cf contains
other costs associated with futures trading, including costs of information, costs of
training the financial staff, and costs of implementing sophisticated risk assessment
procedures.
Figure 15: Perfectly hedged economy with hedging costs cf = 0, cf = 50, and
cf = 100.
Figure 15 presents the perfectly hedged economy for different values of cf . Increasing
costs have a negative effect on investment leading to reduced output. Figure 16
compares the IS curve without hedging to a perfectly hedged IS curve with cf = 200.
13Duffie (1989, p. 11).
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For this high value of cf , the perfectly hedged equilibrium is inferior to the crisis
equilibrium in the case without hedging.
Figure 16: Perfect hedge (fd = 1) and ‘no hedge’ (fd = 0) with cf = 200.
However, the values of cf in Figures 15 and 16 were chosen arbitrarily in order to
stress the linkage between trading costs and output. The extremely high value in
Figure 16 does not correspond to empirical findings. Generally, trading financial
derivatives on organized exchanges costs only a fraction of contract size. Trading
over-the-counter derivatives, often, does not involve any trading costs. Therefore,
in reality, futures trading costs will not have such an direct impact on output.
Nevertheless, there is an indirect linkage since firms base their risk management
decision, and hence, their exposure to specific risks at least partly on the costs of
risk management. In this way, trading costs have an impact on the risk exposure of
investment and therefore on output.
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4.4 Private asset allocation and capital flight
In the previous sections we investigated the role of firms’ risk management and
investment strategies on economic stability. We therefore focussed on the goods
market equilibrium curve. We assumed that firms can manage their exposure to
currency risk and hence influence their investments’ sensitivity to exchange rate
changes.
Here we now pay attention to the risk of private asset holders. We introduce a new
parameter α into the financial markets equilibrium curve which represents this risk
of private asset holders:14
eFp = g(r(Y,M0)− r¯∗ − βε(e0
e
− 1),M0 +B0 + eFp0, α) (22)
If there is a depreciation of the domestic currency (i.e., e increases) the value of
foreign bonds demand eF dp measured in domestic currency will increase. Hence, a
growing potential threat of a depreciation of the domestic currency increases the
demand for foreign bonds. Therefore eF dp depends positively on α (i.e., gα > 0).
We assume that households do not have access to futures markets to deal with this
risk. The only possibility for households to avoid the risk is to reallocate their
asset holdings from domestic into foreign bonds. Flaschel and Semmler (2006, p.
17) note that this process of reallocation “may be considered as capital flight from
the domestic currency into the foreign one,” here still confined to the behavior of
14For more details see Flaschel and Semmler (2006).
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domestic households only.
Figure 17: Capital flight in the IS-AA diagram.
Figure 17 shows the effects of such capital flight. A rise in α shifts the AA curve
to the right (AA’). The AA curve in Figure 17 shifts to such an extent that the
good equilibrium (A) and the intermediate equilibrium (B) completely disappear.
Therefore, the system moves to the new crisis equilibrium (D).
Although the shock pushing the system towards the crisis equilibrium (D) shows up
in the AA curve, the main cause of the crisis is, again, the sigmoid nonlinearity in
the goods market equilibrium curve. Therefore, Figure 18 presents the effect of an
increase in the risk parameter α in the case of a perfectly hedged economy (fd = 1).
Here, an increase in α leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency, but also
to output expansion due to positive competitiveness effects which in turn lead to
a trade surplus (i.e., NXe > 0 and NXe > Ie since Ie = 0 in the perfectly hedged
economy). Hence, corporate hedging does not prevent the domestic currency from
25
depreciating. However, there is no output loss in the perfectly hedged economy.
Figure 18: Capital flight in a perfectly hedged economy.
5 Conclusions
In this article we investigated the role of firms’ risk management strategies (i.e. risk
reduction or risk taking) in balance-sheet triggered currency crises. We modelled
a direct linkage between microeconomic risk management and macroeconomic sta-
bility in a flexible exchange rate regime and found that corporate risk management
can substantially affect economic stability. The conclusions we obtain are at the
expense of relatively strong assumptions on the underlying model. Firms rely on
debt denominated in foreign currency. They know their currency risk exposure and
have the required skills and access to futures markets to deal with their exposure.
Another strong assumption concerns the futures markets. Linear financial deriva-
tives like currency futures are the only risk management vehicles discussed in this
26
investigation. These futures contracts exactly meet the firms’ requirements regard-
ing timing and contract size. Therefore, these contracts allow firms to perfectly
hedge their currency exposure. Although this is possible, it might not be in the best
interest of the firms.
An advantage of this model is its flexibility. We can study different types of futures
trading, from the minimization of the underlying risk (i.e., a perfect hedge) to ad-
ditional risk taking (i.e., speculation) in futures markets. Although our analysis is
not based on empirical data, the main intuition of our results is robust. In partic-
ular, futures trading (or derivatives trading in general) has real effects, at least to
the extend that futures trading affects the exposure of firms’ cash flows to specific
risky variables. Controlling these exposures has direct effects on a firm’s investment
strategy and therefore on output.
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